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ADDRESSING ACQUAINTANCE RAPE: THE NEW
DIRECTION OF THE RAPE LAW REFORM
MOVEMENT
INTRODUCTION
As the status of women has elevated throughout history, laws
criminalizing unwanted sexual conduct have mirrored this change.' At one
time, rape was viewed as an offense against a victim's household rather
than as a crime against a victim.' A woman's consent to sexual acts was
considered so insignificant that, in some instances, a man who married a
woman without her family's consent committed the same offense as a
I See JEANNE C. MARSH ET AL., RAPE AND THE LIMITS OF LAW REFORM 3 (1982)
(recognizing that legislative reforms reflect "ongoing transformation" of American women
(quoting Leigh Bienen,RapeIII-NationalDevelopments inRapeReformLegislation, 6 WOMEN'S
RTS. L. REP. 170, 213 (1980))).
2 Though rape is generally recognized as a crime that can be committed by or against a male
or female, the term "rape" is used in this Note in its most prevalent sense-the rape of women
by men.
3 See JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, LAW, SEX, AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE 48,
249 (1987); SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 17 (1975). Under the earliest forms of
social order, the union of men and women occurred by a violent custom known as "bride
capture" whereby a man forcibly seized a woman, took title to her person, and "staked a claim
to her body." Id. at 16-17; see 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAvS OF
ENGLAND 951 (George Chase ed., 3d ed. 1910) (prohibiting offenses of forcible abduction and
marriage of women against their will). In exchange for earning a man's protection against other
male attackers, a woman was treated as a chattel and a crime against her body was considered
a crime against a man's estate. BROWNMILLER, supra, at 17. Thus, rape law developed through
"the back door" as a property crime committed by one man against another. Id. at 18. Some
later societies considered it more "civilized" to obtain a bride by a monetary payment to the
bride's father rather than through forcible capture; however, bride capture remained an acceptable
spoil of warfare. Id. (referring to ancient Babylonian and Mosaic law). In these societies, the rape
of an unmarried woman was a crime against her father or his household because it decreased a
woman's value on the marriage market. Id.; see BRUNDAGE, supra, at 48, 55, 249 (discussing
similar treatment under ancient Roman, canon, and Jewish law). In some instances, the father
could seek either criminal charges or civil damages. Id. at 48. The rape of a married woman,
however, was labeled "adultery" in many societies, and, if her husband permitted, the woman
would be punished along with the man. BROWNMILLER, supra, at 19 (noting that such women
were "bound and thrown into the river" as per Code of Hammurabi, or "stoned to death at the
gates of the city" prior to codification of Mosaic law).
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rapist.4
In recent history, the victim's consent to sexual conduct has become
the paramount issue in defining rape.5 At common law, rape was defined
as carnal knowledge of a woman, other than one's wife, by force or the
threat of force, and against her will. 6  Therefore, courts required actual
physical resistance by the victim and substantial force by the assailant as
proof that the sexual intercourse was nonconsensual.7
Traditionally, criminal justice systems treated alleged rapes with great
caution and suspicion.' Under the pretense that the intimate nature of the
crime made it difficult to prove the defendant's innocence, evidentiary rules
developed that required corroboration of the victim's testimony, penalized
victims who did not complain promptly, and tolerated the admission of
evidence regarding the victim's sexual history.9 In fact, it was often
4 See BRUNDAGE, supra note 3, at 48. Under ancient Roman law, for example, acts of rape
and elopement were treated as a single offense called raptus. Id. At most, the woman's consent
mitigated the penalty imposed upon the man. Id.; see BROWNMILLER, supra note 3, at 18 (noting
that women's consent to sexual intercourse was essentially irrelevant in early forms of rape law).
- See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 29 (1987); CASSIA SPOHN & JULIE HORNEY, RAPE LAW
REFORM: A GRASSROOTS REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPACT 23 (1992); Martha Chamallas, Consent,
Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 777 (1988).
6 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at 951; ESTRICH, supra note 5, at 8; SPOHN & HORNEY,
supra note 5, at 21.
7 See ESTRICH, supra note 5, at 5. Most serious crimes require a mens rea of actual
knowledge, recklessness, or at least negligence to establish that the defendant possessed a criminal
state of mind. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 212-13 (2d ed.
1986); Catherine Trevison, Note, Changing SexualAssault Law and the Hmong, 27 IND. L. REV.
393, 408 (1993). The rationale for this principle is expressed by the maxim "actus notfacit reum
nisi mens sit rea (an act does not make one guilty unless his mind is guilty)." LAFAVE & SCOTT,
supra, at 212. Most jurisdictions, however, dispensed with an express mens rea requirement for
rape because the act of sexual intercourse accomplished by force and against the resistance of the
woman was thought to evince sufficient criminal intent. See ESTRICH, supra note 5, at 94-95
(discussing that culpable mental state was not required for rape conviction in numerous
jurisdictions); Trevison, supra, at 408 (noting that force and resistance elements were considered
"functional equivalent" of criminal intent to commit rape).
8 SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 5, at 24; ESTRICH, supra note 5, at 5. "Traditional wisdom,
reflected in common law, held that rape should be treated differently from other crimes because
of the danger of false charges by vindictive or mentally disturbed women." SPOHN & HORNEY,
supra note 5, at 24. Indeed, centuries ago, the English Lord Chief Justice Matthew Hale
cautioned that rape "is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be
defended by the party accused, tho never so innocent." 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE
PLEAS OF THE CROWN 635 (P.R. Glazebrook ed. 1971).
9 ESTRICH, supra note 5, at 5; see Ronet Bachman & Raymond Paternoster, A Contemporary
Look at the Effects of Rape Law Reform: How Far Have We Really Come?, 84 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 554, 558 (1993) (noting that concern with protecting men accused of rape created
"serious" evidentiary and procedural "impediments"). Attempts to make rape cases difficult to
prosecute may have their roots in early forms of rape law. At one time, canon law only
recognized the rape of "an 'honest' . .. [women of] . . . good legal standing." JAMES A.
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assumed that women falsely accused men of rape,10 and that women had
a duty to prevent rape from occurring." In effect, "[tjhe usual procedural
guarantees and the constitutional mandate that the government prove the
man's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt [were] not considered enough to
protect the man accused of rape."' 2
In response, during the 1970s, feminists and criminal justice advocates
lobbied for changes in state rape laws through a movement for rape law
reform (the "Rape Law Reform Movement"). 3 The Rape Law Reform
Movement was founded on both pragmatic and ideological bases. 14 Both
feminists and criminal justice advocates were largely concerned with rape
laws and evidentiary rules that permitted officials to use "legally irrelevant
assessments of the victim's character, behavior, and relationship with the
defendant," 5 which resulted in low reporting and conviction rates.
16
BRUNDAGE, Rape and Marriage in the Medieval Canon Law, in SEX, LAW AND MARRIAGE IN
THE MIDDLE AGES pt. VIII, at 71 (1993). In effect, subsequent rape laws also offered protection
only to such "honest" women by allowing courts to hear evidence which cast victims in an
unfavorable light. Indeed, in response to defendants' claims that the victims "'precipitated'"
attacks by their provocative dress, questionable behavior, or reputations, victims were left to
"prove that they [were] worthy of protection under the law." SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 5,
at 20.
10 See SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 5, at 24 (noting that common law reflected falsehoods
traditionally associated with rape); George E. Dix, 'Date Rape' Cases Call for New Definition
of Consent, N.J. L.J., Apr. 19, 1993, at 17 (noting criticism that pre-reform rape statutes'
excessive focus on victims allowed defendants to invoke perception that women lie about rape out
of embarrassment or revenge); John D. Ingram, Date Rape: It's Time for "No" to Really Mean
"No, " 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 3, 7 (1993) (discussing legal system's ability to perpetuate notion that
alleged rape victims seek notoriety, marriage, money, or revenge). As English Lord Chief Justice
Matthew Hale warned:
[I]f she be of evil fame, and stand unsupported by others; if she concealed the injury
for any considerable time after she had opportunity to complain; if the place, where
the fact was alleged to be committed, was where it was possible she might have been
heard, and she made no outcry; these and the like circumstances carry a strong but not
conclusive presumption that her testimony is false or feigned.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at 953 (discussing English Lord Chief Justice Hale's comments). In
reality, recent studies indicate that only 2% of reported rapes are false allegations. See JULIE A.
ALLISON & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, RAPE: THE MISUNDERSTOOD CRIME 11 (1993) (noting
2% false report rate is same for other major crimes).
1 See ALLISON & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 10, at 98-99 (examining myth that women are
responsible for being raped because "[a]ny healthy woman can resist a rapist if she really wants
to"); Ingram, supra note 10, at 7 (noting view that women are responsible for extent to which
sexual activity progresses).
12 ESTRICH, supra note 5, at 5.
23 See SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 5, at 20; Bachman & Paternoster, supra note 9, at 554-
55.
'4 See MARSH ET AL., supra note 1, at 4; Bachman & Paternoster, supra note 9, at 554-55;
ALLISON & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 10, at 209-11.
'5 SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 5, at 18.
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Additionally, feminists sought symbolic reformation that would highlight
the violent nature of the crime and eliminate the stigma and myths
connected with rape victims.17 Criminal justice systems were criticized
for maintaining procedures "mired in assumptions inconsistent with the
realities of the crime and the activities of women in [contemporary]
society. " 18
Generally, the Rape Law Reform Movement focused on amending
rape laws in four critical areas:' 9  (1) the scope of rape law;" (2) the
standard for proving nonconsent;2 ' (3) the requirement that the victim's
testimony be corroborated;' and (4) the admissibility of evidence
16 See id.; Bachman & Paternoster, supra note 9, at 555.
See Bachman & Paternoster, supra note 9, at 555; ALLISON & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note
10, at 210. See generally Lynn Hecht Schafran, Writing and Reading About Rape: A Primer, 66
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 979 (1993) (dispelling myths commonly connected with incidents of rape).
I8 MARSH ET AL., supra note 1, at 1.
'9 SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 5, at 21-29.
' Rape traditionally was defined as a specified crime which did not include a number of
questionable sexual acts such as "attacks on male victims, acts other than sexual intercourse,
sexual assaults with an object, or sexual assaults by a spouse." SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note
5. at 22; see ALLISON & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 10, at 211-12 (discussing narrow definition
of rape).
As a result of reform efforts, states replaced the single crime of rape with a number of
graded, gender-neutral sexual offenses that defined crimes by: the type of sexual contact or
penetration involved; the amount of coercion or force used by the offender; the resulting injury
to the victim; and the age and capacity of the victim. SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 5, at 22; see
ESTRICH, supra note 5, at 81; see, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, paras. 5/12-13 to -14 (Smith-
Hurd 1993) ("criminal sexual assault" and "aggravated criminal sexual assault"); IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 709.1-.4 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995) ("sexual abuse" in first, second, and third degrees);
MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.520b (West 1991) ("criminal sexual conduct"), NEv. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 200.366 (Michie 1992) ("sexual assault"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2 (West
1995) ("sexual assault"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 3252-3253 (Supp. 1994) ("sexual assault"
and "aggravated sexual assault"); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994)
("sexual assault").
In addition to clarifying and expanding criminally punishable conduct, these changes sought
to increase the number of sexual crimes that were prosecuted and convicted; it was believed that
lesser included offenses allowed prosecutors to plea bargain and offer juries an alternative to
acquittal where reluctant to convict of forcible rape. SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 5, at 22. In
some instances, states even replaced the word "rape" with terms such as "sexual assault" or
'criminal sexual conduct" to emphasize the violent nature of the crime, ALLISON & WRIGHTS-MAN, supra note 10, at 212, and to avoid historic misconceptions connected with the term "rape."
Ingram, supra note 10, at 16.
2_ See infra part II.B (discussing nonconsent standard).
Corroboration has been described as "that doctrine of the [criminal] law which requires
that certain suspect evidence be supplemented by a minimum of independent inculpatory fact or
circumstance, as a matter of law, before a jury may consider whether its weight or sufficiency
warrants a conviction." Irving Fendel, Note, Corroboration in the New York Criminal Law, 24
BROOK. L. REV. 324, 324 (1958). Due to the suspicion with which rape charges were handled,
see supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text, courts often would not permit rape convictions
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regarding the victim's prior sexual conduct. 3  Studies analyzing the
effects of reform efforts have had "equivocal" results.24 It is generally
agreed, however, that rape law reform has been particularly ineffective
with respect to a certain class of rape cases-acquaintance rape. 2
based on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim. See SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 5, at 24.
Furthermore, judges were often required to read a cautionary instruction to the jury warning them
of the highly suspicious nature of rape charges. Id.; see also Ingram, supra note 10, at 14 (stating
that jury instructions on credibility were "specially drafted for rape trials"). Courts required
evidence to support the victim's testimony on some or all of the elements of the case-the
woman's word was not enough. SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 5, at 24, ALLISON &
WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 10, at 204; see SUE BESSMER, THE LAWS OF RAPE 105 (1984) (noting
that some jurisdictions required corroboration as matter of law, while others allowed
uncorroborated testimony of victim only if testimony was clear and convincing and underlying
circumstances pointed to probable guilt of accused).
After complaints that these requirements were sexually discriminatory and unnecessarily
stringent, most states removed the corroboration requirement. SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 5,
at 24-25; see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.520h (,Vest 1991) (providing "testimony
of a victim need not be corroborated in prosecutions of [criminal sexual conduct]"). Though these
changes sought to increase the number of rape prosecutions and convictions, SPOHN & HORNEY,
supra note 5, at 25, they are equally important for allowing the fact-finder to determine the
victim's credibility, rather than presuming that the woman's word could never stand alone.
3 Evidence regarding the victim's sexual history was considered relevant to her consent and
credibility. MARSH ET AL., supra note 1, at 22; SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 5, at 25. This
practice was justified under the antiquated notions that unchaste women are more likely to consent
to intercourse and to lie about it than are chaste women. MARSH ET AL., supra note 1, at 22;
SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 5, at 25; Ingram, supra note 10, at 17. The admissibility of this
evidence was criticized for being discriminatory and outdated in light of conventional notions of
sexual relations. SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 5, at 26; Ingram, supra note 10, at 17. In
response, many states enacted "rape shield laws" to limit the admissibility of evidence of a
victim's sexual history. MARSH ET AL., supra note 1, at 22-23; SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note
5, at 26; see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (West 1991) (limiting evidence of
victim's sexual conduct to past sexual conduct with accused and "instances of sexual activity
showing the source or origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease"); see also United States v.
Saunders, 736 F. Supp. 698 (E.D. Va. 1990), aff'd, 943 F.2d 388 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 1105 (1992) ("[W]hether a woman has consented once or myriad times, and whether
she has done so for love or money, she is, in any event, entitled by law to be free from
nonconsensual sexual contact. A woman's past behavior, however unchaste, confers on no one
a license to commit rape.").
I Bachman & Paternoster, supra note 9, at 556. One study in the jurisdiction of Michigan
concluded that statutory reform efforts can have a "profound influence" on the successful prose-
cution of rape cases, MARSH ET AL., supra note 1, at 25, but little impact on factors that are
beyond the reach of the criminal justice system, such as victims' reporting of rape. Id. at 27: see
Bachman & Paternoster, supra note 9, at 556 n.9 (discussing Marsh's Michigan study). But see
SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 5, at 173 (stating comprehensive study of rape law reform in
Michigan, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Texas, Georgia, and Washington. D.C. found that. "[i]n most
... jurisdictions ... studied, the reforms had no impact").
2 See, e.g, SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 5, at 162-64 (discussing that elimination of
resistance and corroboration requirements had little influence in acquaintance rape cases since
such factors are still vital in decisions of prosecutors to prosecute and juries to convict); MARSH
ET AL., supra note 1, at 95-102 (evaluating negative responses of criminal justice officials in
1995]
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In recent years, there has been a growing recognition that most rapes
do not occur under "traditional" circumstances where an armed stranger
jumps out of the bushes.2' Rather, acquaintance rapes are those commit-
ted by friends, relatives, boyfriends, colleagues, and other acquaintances
of the victim. 27  Given that approximately eighty-five percent of all
victims are raped by someone they know, it is especially troubling that
the Rape Law Reform Movement has not adequately addressed the
prosecution of acquaintance rape cases. Moreover, studies unfortunately
reveal that statutory reform has limited impact due to the degree of
discretion afforded individuals in the criminal justice system.29 Further
statutory reform is nevertheless necessary to ensure that convictions are
possible for those acquaintance rapes that succeed in overcoming indivi-
duals' prejudicial attitudes.
Part I of this Note illustrates that many post-reform statutes define
rape in terms that fail to encompass certain instances of acquaintance
rape-a problem long recognized by rape law reformers and recently
embraced by state legislators. Part II discusses proposals for further
reform to correct this shortcoming and focuses on problems encountered
by legislators regarding the structure of rape statutes and definition of
"nonconsent." Part III analyzes these proposals and suggests which
situations involving acquaintance rape); Bachman & Paternoster, supra note 9, at 574 (conceding
that "there continues to be a large 'acquaintance discount'" in treatment of rape cases).
2 ESTRICH, supra note 5. at 29; see SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 5, at 19-20; ALLISON &
WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 10, at 60-61; Ingram, supra note 10, at 5-6.
27 ESTRICH, supra note 5, at 29; ALLISON & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 10, at 64.
2 ALLISON & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 10, at 5, 63; see Margaret D. Bonilla, What
Feminists Are Doing to Rape Ought to Be a Crime, POL'Y REV., Fall 1993, at 22 (reporting that
70% to 80% of women know their attackers). It is difficult to accurately determine the frequency
of rape. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), in 1990, 102,555 rapes were
reported to the police nationwide. Alice Vachss, Rape and Denial: A Federal Nonsolution, NEW
REPUBLIC, Nov. 22, 1993, at 14 (citing FBI's Uniform Crime Reports). Because rape is the
single most underreported crime, however, official reports inaccurately reflect the frequency of
its occurrence. ESTRICH, supra note 5, at 10; Bonilla, supra, at 22. Many women, especially
victims of acquaintance rape, blame themselves and do not realize that they have been raped.
ALLISON & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 10, at 61, 63. Others recognize the crime, but choose not
to report it. Id. at 172; see ESTRICH, supra note 5, at 12-13.
Thus, while the United States Department of Justice concedes that only 53 % of all rapes or
attempted rapes are reported to the police, ALLISON & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 10, at 7, studies
indicate that only approximately 5 % to 9.5 % of all rapes are reported. Id. at 6-7. The frequency
of rape, therefore, is thought to be more accurately reflected in studies that include unreported
rapes. For example, in a recent national survey, 15% of the women surveyed reported that they
were "raped as adults at least one time in their life" and, of these women, 85% were acquainted
with the rapist. Id. at 63.
See SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 5, at 160, 163; MARSH ET AL., supra note 1, at 118-
19; supra note 25 (discussing effects of discretion).
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scheme defines rape in a manner that adequately protects acquaintance rape
victims, and properly defines criminally punishable sexual conduct.
Finally, Part IV briefly examines prosecuting techniques that address the
limitations placed on statutory reform by individuals who exercise
discretion in the criminal justice system.
I. LIMITATIONS OF THE REFORMED DEFINITION OF RAPE
Although the Rape Law Reform Movement opened the door to the
litigation of rape cases previously considered "unprosecutable,"3 ° many
post-reform statutes define rape in terms that do not include certain types
of acquaintance rapes. This Part demonstrates how the reform goal of
eliminating resistance and nonconsent requirements in rape statutes is
appropriate in stranger rape cases, but prevents the successful prosecution
of many acquaintance rapes.
A. Elimination of Resistance and Nonconsent Requirements
Prior to the Rape Law Reform Movement, rape law was unique in that
it required a victim to physically resist her assailant to demonstrate
nonconsent.3' As part of the historic distrust of women claiming they
were raped, courts required objective proof that nonconsensual intercourse,
in fact, occurred. 32  As demonstrated by one court, the law demanded
fierce resistance to prove nonconsent:
[Voluntary submission by the woman, while she has power to resist, no
matter how reluctantly yielded, removes from the act an essential element
of the crime of rape. ... [I]f the carnal knowledge was with the
voluntary consent of the woman, no matter how tardily given, or how
much force had theretofore been employed, it is no rape.33
The resistance requirement was satisfied only if there was evidence that the
woman displayed "the most vehement exercise of every physical means or
30 See LINDA A. FAIRSTEIN, SEXUAL VIOLENCE 134 (1993) (acknowledging that past reform
efforts made it possible to litigate acquaintance rape cases which were previously unprosecutable).
3' See ESTRICH, supra note 5, at 29; MARSH ET AL., supra note 1, at 21; SPOHN & HORNEY,
supra note 5, at 23. For example, when a victim complains of robbery, the prosecutor is not
required to prove that the victim struggled with the defendant and involuntarily gave up his or
her wallet. See Ingram, supra note 10, at 7-8 (hypothesizing situation where defense attorney
cross-examines robbery victim as he or she would rape victim).
32 See Ingram, supra note 10, at 12; see also ESTRICH, supra note 5, at 40 (recognizing that
resistance requirement purportedly served as notice that sexual intercourse was not welcomed);
Dana Berliner, Comment, Rethinking the Reasonable Belief Defense to Rape, 100 YALE L.J.
2687, 2696 (1991) (noting resistance requirement's popularity for ability to serve as measure "so
stark ... it was not open to misinterpretation by defendants or juries").
-13 Reynolds v. State, 42 N.W. 903, 904 (Neb. 1889).
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faculty within the woman's power to resist the penetration of her per-
son."34 This standard was most strictly applied in acquaintance rape
cases.
35
The physical resistance requirement was alarming to both feminists
and criminal justice advocates because it subjected a woman to a higher
degree of violence by prompting her attacker to use force in response to
her resistance.36 Moreover, it was criticized for focusing on the victim's
behavior37 and requiring that all women react to rape in a uniform and
patriarchal manner.38 In response, most states removed their resistance
requirements.39 Other states eliminated nonconsent as an element to be
I Brown v. State, 106 N.W. 536, 538 (Wis. 1906). The Supreme Court of Wisconsin's
decision in Brown is often cited to exemplify the degree to which women were required to resist.
See, e.g., ESTRICH, supra note 5, at 29-30; SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 5, at 23. In Brown,
the victim was a sixteen-year-old girl who alleged that she was raped by her neighbor. Brown,
106 N.W. at 537. The girl claimed that her neighbor seized her in a field, tripped her to the
ground, and forced himself upon her. Id. She further testified:
I tried as hard as I could to get away. I was trying all the time to get away just as
hard as I could. I was trying to get up; I pulled at the grass; I screamed as hard as I
could, and he told me to shut up, and I didn't, and then he held his hand on my mouth
until I was almost strangled.
Id. (internal quotations omitted). The jury convicted but the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
ultimately reversed because the victim did not sufficiently demonstrate her resistance: -[WMhen
one pauses to reflect upon the terrific resistance which the determined woman should make, [her
absence of bruises and torn clothing] is well-nigh incredible." Id. at 539.
See ESTRICH, supra note 5, at 32 (concluding that resistance standard was used in
discriminatory manner where "utmost resistance" was required in acquaintance rape cases but not
where accused was stranger or minority); see also ALLISON & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 10, at
202 (noting selective application of resistance standard).
36 SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 5, at 23; see Ingram, supra note 10, at 14 (citing report of
New York legislature that "'the likelihood of receiving serious injury during a rape attack
increases significantly when the victim resists her attacker.'" (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00
note (Consol. 1984)); Berliner, supra note 32, at 2692 (discussing realization that victims who
resist rape are injured more than victims who submit to rape).
37 Dix, supra note 10, at 17 (noting criticism that pre-reform rape statutes focused too much
on victim's behavior and, in effect, put victim on trial).
8 See ESTRICH, supra note 5, at 64-66. Judges who do not recognize tears or fear as
reasonable responses to rape indicate that "[t]heir version of a reasonable person is one who does
not scare easily, one who does not feel vulnerable, one who is not passive, one who fights back,
not cries. The reasonable woman, it seems, is not a schoolboy 'sissy'; she is a real man." Id. at
65; see ALLISON & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 10, at 202 (noting that "legal system defined
resistance in male terms").
31 See, e.g., IOWA CODE. ANN. § 709.5 (West 1993) ("[I]t shall not be necessary to establish
physical resistance by a participant in order to establish that an act of sexual abuse was committed
by force or against the will of the participant."); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520i (West
1991) (stating that "victim need not resist the actor in prosecution [for criminal sexual conduct]").
However, in states where nonconsent remains an element of rape, removal of the resistance
requirement appears to have been a futile effort; defendants still emphasize the victim's failure
to resist and "encouraged judges and juries to regard a victim's protestations as mere observance
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proven by the prosecution, yet permitted consent as a defense. 4
Although these reforms successfully shifted the focus away from the
victim and eliminated the much-criticized resistance element, they also
emphasized the requirement that the defendant use force4 -a factor not
always sufficiently present in acquaintance rapes. This approach of
emphasizing force and de-emphasizing victims' nonconsent has eased the
prosecution of traditional, stranger rape cases, but has frustrated the
prosecution of nonaggravated acquaintance rapes.42 Essentially, where a
victim expresses verbal nonconsent, but does not physically resist, and the
assailant does not use force beyond that necessary to accomplish penetra-
tion, a rape incident may not fit within the reformed definition of rape.43
The problem that this situation poses recently arose in a case decided by
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 44
B. Commonwealth v. Berkowitz
In Commonwealth v. Berkowitz,4' the complainant ("Complainant")
and the defendant, Berkowitz ("Berkowitz"), were both college students at
of social conventions by coquettish women who actually seek sexual attention." Dix, supra note
10, at 17.
4 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/12-17 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (providing that "[i]t
shall be a defense to any offense. . . where force or threat of force is an element of the offense
that the victim consented"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-10 (West 1995); see also People v. Khan,
264 N.W.2d 360, 366-67 n.5 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that, although not included in rape
statute, consent is defense to charge of criminal sexual conduct between individuals of sufficient
age and capacity).
In some states, this has effected little change since the prosecution must prove lack of
consent beyond a reasonable doubt once the defendant raises the consent defense. See Berliner,
supra note 32, at 2693 n.43 (citing People v. Haywood, 515 N.E.2d 45, 50 (I11. 1987)); People
v. Thompson, 324 N.W.2d 22, 24-25 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
4, See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520b (West 1991). The Michigan statute
defines criminal sexual conduct in the first degree, in part, as sexual penetration where "[t]he
actor causes personal injury to the victim and force or coercion is used to accomplish sexual
penetration." Id. § 750.520b(1)(f). The code further specifies that the "victim need not resist the
actor in prosecution [for criminal sexual conduct]." Id. § 750.520i.
42 See ESTRICH, supra note 5, at 71 ("In the simple rape case, . . . the 'force' standard may
be as effective, and as punitive, an obstacle to rape convictions as the old 'consent approach.'");
Dix, supra note 10, at 17 (suggesting that emphasis on force, especially where nonconsent has
been eliminated as element, is effective approach in stranger rape cases but is flawed where
victim and accused have prior relationship).
43 See generally Dix, supra note 10, at 17 (discussing limitations of reform legislation with
respect to acquaintance rape cases).
"See Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994).
"641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994).
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East Stroudsberg University.' The incident arose when Complainant
went to her dormitory room, drank a martini, and thereafter went to a
campus lounge to meet her boyfriend. 7 Her boyfriend did not show up,
and Complainant proceeded to a friend's dormitory. 48 After knocking on
her friend's door and receiving no answer, she opened the door and
discovered her friend's roommate, Berkowitz, sleeping on the bed.49
Complainant accepted Berkowitz's offer to stay in the room, but
declined his invitation to sit on his bed, opting to sit on the floor in-
stead." She also refused his request for a back-rub." Berkowitz then
attempted a series of failed sexual advances which culminated in his
pushing Complainant onto the bed, removing her undergarments, and
penetrating her.12
Complainant's testimony revealed that: Berkowitz's hands did not
restrain her at the time of penetration; Berkowitz's only use of force was
the weight of his body on top of her; Complainant sought to leave the room
but never attempted to unlock the door; and Complainant said "no"
throughout the incident.53
Berkowitz was charged with rape and indecent assault. 4 Despite a
jury conviction on both charges, 5 in a unanimous decision, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania vacated the rape conviction. 6
The court emphasized that Pennsylvania's rape statute specifically
See Frank Reeves, House Urged to Reject Changes in Rape Law, PiTrSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, June 16, 1994, at B9 [hereinafter House Urged] (discussing facts of Berkowitz).
41 Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1163.
4 Id.
49 Id.
5 Id.
51 Id.
52 Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1163. As the court stated:
[Berkowitz] moved to the floor beside her, lifted up her shirt and bra and massaged her
breasts. He then unfastened his pants and unsuccessfully attempted to put his penis in
her mouth. They both stood up, and he locked the door. He returned to push her onto
the bed, and removed her undergarments from one leg. He then penetrated her vagina
with his penis. After withdrawing and ejaculating on her stomach, he stated, "Wow,
I guess we just got carried away," to which she responded, "No, we didn't get carried
away, you got carried away."
Id.
11 Id. at 1164.
5 Id. at 1163 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3121, 3126 (Supp. 1994), amended by
1995 Pa. Laws 10).
55 Id.
56 Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1163.
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required a showing of forcible compulsion,57 while the indecent assault
provision specified that the act be committed "without the consent of the
other person." 58  Finding the lack-of-consent provision "conspicuously
absent" from the rape statute,5 9 the court insisted that the forcible
compulsion element "be interpreted as something more than a lack of
consent."6" While conceding Complainant's testimony claiming she said
"no" throughout the incident was relevant to the issue of nonconsent, the
court held that "where there is a lack of consent, but no showing of either
physical force, a threat of physical force, or psychological coercion, the
'forcible compulsion' requirement under [the Pennsylvania rape statute] is
not met. ,61
C. Issues Presented by Berkowitz
Berkowitz has been regarded as "'a huge backward step for women's
rights."'62 Essentially, the case has been interpreted to mean that saying
"no" is insufficient proof of rape.63 By requiring more than verbal
57 Id. at 1164; see 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (Supp. 1994), amended by 1995 Pa.
Laws 10. Pennsylvania's rape statute provided, in part:
A person commits a felony of the first degree when he engages in sexual intercourse
with another person not his spouse:
(1) by forcible compulsion;
(2) by threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance by a person of
reasonable resolution;
(3) who is unconscious; or
(4) who is so mentally deranged or deficient that such person is incapable of
consent.
Id. (emphasis added).
'- 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3126 (Supp. 1994), amended by 1995 Pa. Laws 10.
Pennsylvania's indecent assault statute provided, in part, that "[a] person who has indecent
contact with another not his spouse, or causes such other to have indecent contact with him, is
guilty of indecent assault if. . . he does so without the consent of the other person." Id.
S9 Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1164.
60 Id. at 1165.
6" Id. at 1164.
. Women's Groups Say No to Rape Case Ruling; Pennsylvania High Court Decision Stirs
Anger, ST. Louis PoST-DISPATCH, June 3, 1994, at 1A [hereinafter Women's Groups Say No]
(quoting prosecutor in Berkowitz, James P. Gregor).
63 See Dale Russakoff, Where Women Just Can't Say 'No': Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Rules Force Is Needed to Prove Rape, WASH. POST, June 3, 1994, at Al (commenting that
Berkowitz is referred to as "'No Is Not Enough'" case); see alsoAll Things Considered (National
Public Radio broadcast, July 27, 1994), available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File
[hereinafterAll Things Considered]. Shortly after the Berkowitz decision, a prosecutor in another
Pennsylvania rape case reportedly "dropped the charges, saying it was invalid because the woman
protested only with words and did not fight back." Id. One Philadelphia prosecutor commented,
"I think [the Berkowitz] decision was incorrect, but I'm bound by it.. . ." Id.
Berkowitz's attorney stated, however, that he felt that the decision was based on unusual
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nonconsent, the court, in effect, read the physical resistance requirement
back into the rape statute64 in. situations where the assailant does not use
force beyond that necessary for penetration.6"
Although the court did not expressly hold that it required physical
resistance, it stated that sufficient force was not present. 66  The level of
force required in rape cases, however, is generally that force necessary to
overcome female nonconsent.67 Where, as in Berkowitz, the victim's
nonconsent is expressed through words, rather than conduct, the force
applied by the assailant to overcome nonconsent is perceived as normal
sexual activity.68 Thus, in cases that lack excessive force and appear
before courts that do not honor verbal nonconsent, the force employed
becomes criminal only at the point that it is used to overcome the victim's
physical resistance. In such situations, rapists will be convicted only if the
victim physically resisted-a fact that directly contradicts an important goal
of rape law reform69 and conflicts with rape counselling that teaches
women not to physically resist their assailants.7"
facts and, therefore, would not set a precedent. Johnna A. Pro & Frank Reeves, Court Limits
Rape Law Victims Must Face Threat of Force to Get Conviction, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE,
June 2, 1994, at Al [hereinafter Court Limits Rape Law]. Similarly, Pennsylvania district
attorneys view the case as an "'unusual'" one with little impact. Court Says Rape Law
Unchanged; Ruling Draws Wide Criticism, Others See Little Impact, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE,
June 3, 1994, at Al; see House Urged, supra note 46, at B9 (citing Philadelphia assistant district
attorney, who added that "it is relatively easy 'to extract some indication of force or threat of
force"').
I See Dix. supra note 10, at 17 (concluding that Berkowitz functionally reinstated resistance
requirement); James P. Gregor, Saying 'No' Should Be Enough, CHI. TRIB., July 3, 1994, at 9
(suggesting that lack of resistance by victim was basis for Berkowitz decision).
I The appellate court in Berkowitz rejected the notion that "the force necessary to accomplish
penetration is sufficient" proof of force. Dix, supra note 10, at 17; see Commonwealth v.
Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338, 1346-47 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
' Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1165.
67 ESTRICH, supra note 5, at 60.
s For example, normal activity such as pressing your weight against someone and removing
their clothing is not considered forceful and, therefore, is normal behavior in consensual situa-
tions. Such activity in the face of verbal nonconsent is considered forceful; however, according
to Berkowitz, it is insufficient force for a rape conviction. See Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1347
(noting that acts such as leaning or placing bodyweight on top of another individual are not
"themselves inconsistent with consensual relations" and "cannot be bootstrapped into sexual inter-
course by forcible compulsion").
I See supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing danger of resisting attacker).
70 In light of the fact that victims' resistance against their attackers often leads to greater
violence against the victim, rape counselors teach women that they should not physically resist
their assailant. See supra note 36 and accompanying text; Gregor, supra note 64, at 9 (discussing
effects of Berkowitz decision); Women's Groups Say No, supra note 62, at 1A (quoting Kathryn
Geller Myers, spokeswoman for Pennsylvania Coalition Against Rape). The attorney who
prosecuted Berkowitz commented that "[i]n the face of the decision, instructors [are] faced with
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Furthermore, the outcome in Berkowitz is counterintuitive. When a
court finds that a rape did not occur, it should conclude that the intercourse
was consensual. In Berkowitz, however, the court's finding that the
defendant committed indecent assault 7' indicates the court's recognition
that the encounter was not consensual. In effect, Berkowitz's actions prior
to penetration-removing Complainant's clothing and touching her
body-were illegal, yet the act of penetration was legal because of the lack
of excessive force.' Clearly, this case sends the disturbing message that
proceeding with sexual intercourse despite verbal nonconsent is not
criminally punishable conduct.
A Berkowitz-type ruling also has a chilling effect on an already grossly
underreported crime: it will cause victims and prosecutors to be very
reluctant to pursue acquaintance rape cases where force is difficult to
prove.7' As rapists are notorious repeat offenders, any impediment to
prosecuting incidents of acquaintance rape may have devastating effects.74
It has long been argued that force requirements should be removed
from rape statutes7 -Berkowitz is merely a recent reminder of this
a dilemma: Do we continue to teach victims to show no resistance and lose the case" in court,
or to fight back and risk injury or even death?" Gregor, supra note 64, at 9.
1, See Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1166.
7 Cf. States Struggle to Define Rape; Is Force Needed? Is 'No'Enough? Rulings Vary, STAR
TRIB., June 3, 1994, at IA [hereinafter States Struggle]. Stephen Schulhofer, a criminal law
professor at the University of Chicago Law School, asserts that states such as Pennsylvania
"trivialized" alleged acquaintance rape attacks "when they classified them as indecent assault."
Id.
11 Women's Groups Say No, supra note 62, at IA. As Gregor commented, acquaintance rape
cases "'are already underreported'" and "many victims will be unwilling to come forward,
knowing their own behavior will be scrutinized. 'There will be a lot more emphasis on whether
she cried out or tried to unlock the door' to get away." Id.; Court Limits Rape Law, supra note
63, at Al.
74 See ALICE VACHSS, SEX CRIMES 91 (1993) (suggesting that "[riapists progress-often they
start with people they know before moving on to strangers"); Peg Tyre & Michele Parente, Rape:
Still a Secret Crime; Crime Figures Show Rise, but How Many Unreported?, N.Y. NEWSDAY.
Apr. 19, 1994, at A5 ("'Rape has a very high rate of recidivism. When a person is arrested for
rape, [it is] usually ... not the first one he has committed.'" (quoting New York Police
Department Special Victims Liason)).
In April 1994, for example, a thirty-five-year-old Wall Street accountant was shot and killed
by an "obsessive ex-boyfriend." Id. Several months earlier, her ex-boyfriend had raped her at
knifepoint. Id. Although in this case the victim terminated the prosecution by withdrawing the
charges, this incident is illustrative of the consequences which any impediment to prosecuting
acquaintance rapes can have. See Cindi Leive, The FinalRape Injustice, GLAMOUR, Nov. 1994,
at 198, 210 (discussing California acquaintance rape incident where prosecutors declined to file
rape charges and accused individual raped and murdered another woman shortly thereafter).
I See, e.g., ESTRICH, supra note 5, at 58-71 (arguing that force standard continues to be
"obstacle" in convicting acquaintance rapists); Robin D. Wiener, Comment, Shifting the
Communication Burden: A Meaningful Consent Standard in Rape, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 143,
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contention. In states where no such statutory reform exists, courts have
attempted to provide judicial remedies to acquaintance rape victims.76
Generally, courts have tried to eliminate force requirements by minimizing
the amount of force necessary for a conviction.' Clearly, courts should
not have to write around the law. Rape statutes should be amended to
remove the force element and reflect that the term "forcible rape" is
redundant since the act of penetration in the face of verbal nonconsent is
force in itself.
II. PROPOSALS FOR STATUTORY REFORM
As demonstrated in Part I of this Note, in certain circumstances,
acquaintance rape cannot be recognized as a serious crime until the force
requirement is removed from rape statutes. In recognition of this principle,
there has been a growing trend for states to criminalize nonconsensual
intercourse, with no additional force requirement.7" The manner in which
155 (1983) (praising Wisconsin rape statute which defines rape in terms of nonconsent, rather
than force (citing Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(3) West (1982))); Russakoff, supra note 63. at Al
(noting trend of states in removing force and resistance requirements from rape statutes).
76 See States Struggle, supra note 72, at 1A ("'Courts are continuing to struggle with how
to address this abusive conduct, which is neither fish nor fowl. . . . These are cases where there
has been some overreaching, disrespect and abuse, but not the overwhelming life-threatening
violence we think of traditionally in rape cases.'" (quoting Professor Schulhofer)).
' See, e.g., State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992). In M. T.S., the Supreme Court
of New Jersey interpreted the state's second-degree sexual assault statute, which is defined, in
part, as sexual penetration by physical force or coercion. Id. at 1269 (referring to N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C: 14-2c(1) (West 1982)). The court specifically addressed the issue of "whether the
element of 'physical force' [was] met simply by an act of non-consensual penetration involving
no more force than necessary to accomplish that result." Id. at 1267. Noting the absence of
reference to the victim's will or resistance in the criminal statute, the court excluded consideration
of the victim's subjective state of mind and responsive behavior in determining the role of force
in sexual penetration. Id. at 1277. The court concluded that any act of sexual penetration without
the affirmative and voluntary consent of the victim constituted sexual assault. Id. Consequently,
the court found that "physical force in excess of that inherent in the act of sexual penetration
[was] not required for such penetration to be unlawful." M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1277; see also
People v. Iniguez, 872 P.2d 1183 (Cal. 1994). In Iniguez, the California Supreme Court held that
the statutory requirement dictating that rape is accomplished through force, violence, or fear of
immediate harm is satisfied when the perpetrator creates circumstances that paralyze the victim
with fear and, thereby, cause submission. Id. at 1187,
78 Russakoff, supra note 63, at Al (noting trend for states to remove proof of force
requirement); see, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.366(1) (Michie 1992); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 76-5-402(1), -406 (1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252 (Supp. 1994); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 940.225(3) (West 1982).
Other states similarly criminalize nonconsensual intercourse, but classify the offense as a
misdemeanor called sexual misconduct, which is distinguished from rape. See, e.g., ALA. CODE
§§ 13A-6-61, -65 (1994) (defining rape in first degree as act of forcible compulsion and sexual
misconduct as nonconsensual act); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.35, .20 (Consol. 1984) (providing
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these statutes should be drafted, however, raises other issues. First, should
nonconsensual intercourse without the presence of aggravating factors such
as force or violence be classified as a lesser offense than nonconsensual
intercourse with the presence of such factors? Second, how should
nonconsent be defined?
A. Structure of Statutes
Perhaps the most favorable observation of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court justices and their decision in Berkowitz was that they were merely
interpreting "'antiquated laws."'"7 The Pennsylvania Legislature appar-
ently agreed: at the time the case was decided, bills were pending in both
the Pennsylvania House and Senate with proposed amendments to the
state's rape law.SO Both of these bills proposed amendments that provide
for rape convictions in the absence of force. The controversy over their
distinctions, however, illustrates the issue of whether nonconsensual
intercourse should be classified as a lesser offense than aggravated
nonconsensual intercourse.
The Pennsylvania Senate bill ("Senate Bill") removed the requirement
that rape be accomplished by forcible compulsion or by the threat of
forcible compulsion, requiring instead that the prosecution prove only that
for rape in first degree if actor used force and sexual misconduct if act was nonconsensual).
However, these states define "lack of consent" as resulting from forcible compulsion or
incapacity to consent; thus, in effect, they do not remove the force element. See N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 130.05 (Consol. 1984) (defining lack of consent, in part, as resulting from forcible
compulsion); Martin v. State, 504 So. 2d 335, 339 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) (holding lack of
consent for sexual misconduct conviction results from forcible compulsion).
79 See Frank Reeves, 'No Means No' Bill Pushed Singel, Senate Judiciary Committee
Chairman Back Stronger Rape Law, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 7, 1994, at B4
[hereinafter Bill Pushed] (quoting Pennsylvania Lieutenant Governor Mark S. Singel).
I Nancy E. Roman, Scales of Justice Weigh Tiers of SexualAssault; State May Reform Rape
Law, WASH. TIMEs, June 16, 1994, at A8 (discussing controversy over amendments to
Pennsylvania's rape statute proposed in wake of Berkowitz); Brad Bumsted. Bill to Change Law
HasLanguishedfor Three Years, GANNET NEWS SERVICE, June 10, 1994 (reporting Pennsylvania
legislature's "mad rush" to correct ruling in Berkowitz); see infra notes 81-84 (reviewing bills
pending in Pennsylvania's legislature at time of Berkowitz decision).
In March 1995, Pennsylvania's governor, Tom Ridge, signed into law a bill that revised
Pennsylvania's criminal code on sexual offenses. See 1995 Pa. Laws 10 (amending PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. tits. 18, 23 & 42 (Supp. 1994)). The amended statute retains the first-degree felony
of "rape," which is defined, in part, in terms of forcible compulsion, and adds the second-degree
felony of "sexual assault," which is defined as nonconsensual sexual intercourse. Id. §§ 3121,
3124.1; see Mario F. Cattabiani, Ridge Signs Bill Rewriting Rape Laws, MORNING CALL
(Allentown, Pa.), April 1, 1995, at A3 (discussing enactment of reformed rape statute).
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the intercourse was nonconsensual. 81 The bill introduced to the Pennsyl-
vania House ("House Bill"), however, proposed a different approach. The
House Bill sought to abolish the current rape statute and replace it with a
graded-offense "sexual assault" statute.' Under this proposal, there
would be two grades of sexual assault: (1) sexual assault, a second-degree
felony requiring only proof of nonconsent;1 and (2) aggravated sexual
assault, a first-degree felony requiring, in part, proof of forcible compul-
sion or the threat of forcible compulsion. 4 Similar graded-offense rape
statutes are currently in force in several states.' Thus, the House Bill
81 Bill Pushed, supra note 79, at B4; see Pa. S. Res. 533, 178th Leg., 1993-1994 Reg. Sess.
(1994) (the "Senate Bill"). Section one of the Senate Bill provided:
Section 3121. Rape.
(A) Offense Defined.-A person commits a felony of the first degree when he engages
in sexual intercourse with another person not his spouse:
(1) without consent of the other person;
(2) who is unconscious;
(3) who is so mentally deranged or deficient that such person is incapable of
consent; or
(4) who is a child ten years of age or younger, if the person engaging in sexual
intercourse with the child is 16 years of age or older.
(B) Spousal Sexual Assault.-Whenever the term "rape" is used in this title or any
other title, it is deemed to include spousal sexual assault as further defined in section
3128 (relating to spousal sexual assault).
(C) Consent.-For the purposes of this section, "consent" shall mean words or overt
actions by a person who is competent to give informed consent indicating freely given
agreement to have sexual intercourse.
Id.; see also Roman, supra note 80, at A8 (discussing Senate Bill).
12 See Pa. H. Res. 160, 178th Leg., 1993-1994 Reg. Sess. § 4 (1994) (the "House Bill").
8 See id. Section four of the House Bill provided, in part:
Section 3122. Sexual Assault.
A defendant commits a felony of the second degree when the defendant
engages in sexual intercourse with a complainant without the complainant's
consent.
Id.
84 Id. Section four of the House Bill provided, in part:
Section 3121. Aggravated Sexual Assault.
A defendant commits a felony of the first degree when the defendant engages in sexual
intercourse with a complainant if:
(1) the defendant does so by forcible compulsion;
(2) the defendant does so by threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent
resistance by a person of reasonable resolution;
(3) the complainant is unconscious or the defendant knows that the complainant
is unaware that the sexual intercourse is occurring . . ..
Id.
8 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 3252-53 (Supp. 1994) (defining sexual assault, and
in part, as nonconsensual sex act and aggravated sexual assault, in part, as sexual assault either
causing serious bodily injury, involving deadly weapon, involving threat to cause serious bodily
injury, applying deadly force, or involving repeated nonconsensual sexual acts); Wis. STAT. ANN.
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treated nonaggravated, nonconsensual intercourse as a second-degree
felony, while the Senate Bill classified it as a first-degree felony.
Pennsylvania House Representative Karen Ritter, who introduced the
House Bill, intended that the aggravated sexual assault charge be used to
prosecute stranger rapes, while acquaintance rape cases would be
prosecuted under the sexual assault statute. s6  Representative Ritter
supported the bill on several grounds. First, she believed that, since other
crimes have similar graded offenses, it is appropriate to have two degrees
of sexual assault.' Supporters of the House Bill similarly believed that
a rapist who, for example, beats a woman violently should not be charged
with the same crime as a rapist who does not use force beyond penetra-
tion.81 Second, it would ensure a greater likelihood of convictions by
juries that are hesitant to impose the same penalty on aggravated and non-
aggravated rapes.89 Supporters who initially rejected the graded-offense
§ 940.225(1)-(3) (,vest 1982 & Supp. 1994) (defining first-degree sexual assault, Class B felony,
as nonconsensual intercourse causing pregnancy or "great bodily harm," second-degree sexual
assault, Class C felony, as nonconsensual intercourse causing injury or illness, and third-degree
sexual assault, Class D felony, as nonconsensual sexual intercourse).
Graded-offense rape statutes are also used by some states that continue to require force as
an element of the crime. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, paras. 5/12-13, -14 (Smith-Hurd
1993) (providing for criminal sexual assault, class 1 felony, and aggravated criminal sexual
assault, class X felony); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 709.1-.4 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995) (defining
sexual abuse in first, second, and third degrees as class A, B, and C felonies, respectively); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2(a), (c) (West 1995) (defining aggravated sexual assault as first-degree
crime and sexual assault as second-degree crime); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.44.040-.060
(West 1988 & Supp. 1995) (defining rape in first, second, and third degrees as class A, B, and
C felonies, respectively).
e6 See Bill Pushed, supra note 79, at B4 (discussing application of penalties proposed under
House Bill); Frank Reeves, Bill Recognizes Additional Kinds of 'Force' in Rape, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAzETTE, June 3, 1994, at A4 (describing graded structure of proposed sexual assault
legislation).
Roman, supra note 80, at A8.
s See id. Ken Pangborn, the head of Men International, a group that counsels and defends
men claiming to be falsely accused of rape and other sexual crimes, expressed support for the
House Bill. Id. While he agrees with the view that "no" should be sufficient, Pangborn supports
changes that reflect the distinction between rapes which involve force and those that involve only
nonconsent. Id. "'Rape is a crime like murder; one size does not fit all.'" Id. (quoting Ken
Pangborn). Similarly, one Pennsylvania district attorney urged the Pennsylvania House to reject
the Senate Bill. House Urged, supra note 46, at B9. "'A two-tiered approach is a recognition of
the way things are in life. There really is a difference between a vicious aggravated sexual assault
and the Berkowitz case. Judges and juries recognize the difference.'" Id. (quoting William Ryan,
head of Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association).
11 See Roman, supra note 80, at A8. "Juries are reluctant to convict someone of a first-degree
felony if they are not convinced ... a sufficient amount of force is present." Id. (quoting
Pennsylvania Representative Ritter); Bill Pushed, supra note 79, at B4 (restating argument of
Pennsylvania Representative Ritter).
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statute later endorsed the House Bill as a "first step" and practical approach
to prevent acquittals in acquaintance rape cases. 9°
Graded-offense statutes have been opposed, however, for their failure
to reflect that the offense of rape should criminalize nonconsensual
intercourse regardless of whether aggravating factors are present. 9' In
particular, graded-offense statutes have been criticized for treating
acquaintance rape as "'quasi rape"' and signalling that it is less grave than
stranger rape.' In fact, the scheme offered by the House Bill has been
discouraged by reformers who note that acquaintance rape may cause more
psychological trauma than stranger rape.93
A third approach, however, was enacted by the state of Utah.94
Utah's statute defines rape as "sexual intercourse with another person
without the victim's consent," a first-degree felony.' In contrast to
Pennsylvania's Senate Bill, Utah's statute also provides for a separate
offense of "aggravated sexual assault," defined, in part, as a rape or other
sexual offense that involves aggravating factors such as bodily injury or the
use or threat of use of a dangerous weapon.96 Aggravated sexual assault
I Roman, supra note 80, at A8 (quoting Kathryn Kolbert, Vice President of Center of
Reproductive Law and Strategy). Kolbert maintains that "rape is rape" and cautions that
acquaintance rape may cause victims worse psychological damage because they are harmed by
persons they trust. Id. (quoting Kathryn Kolbert). However, she favored the House Bill as a
practical alternative to allowing rape to go unpunished. Id. "[A]s a practical reality, I would
rather see some punishment than none at all. If as a first step we have to get a reduced crime,
that might be the way to go.'" Id. (quoting Kathryn Kolbert). Additionally, a researcher for the
Pennsylvania Coalition Against Rape admits that, despite previous rape law reform efforts that
decreased criminal penalties for rape in hopes of more convictions, "'juries remain reluctant to
convict college students of a first-degree felony, and many cases go unprosecuted.'" Id. (quoting
Gail Rawlings, researcher for Pennsylvania Coalition Against Rape). Linda Fairstein, Bureau
Chief of the Sex Crimes Unit for the New York County District Attorney's Office, indicates that
90% of jurors draw a distinction between stranger rape and acquaintance rape and, thus, graded-
offense statutes make it "much easier to get convictions" in the absence of aggravating factors.
Telephone Interview with Linda A. Fairstein, Bureau Chief, Sex Crimes Unit, District Attorney's
Office for the County of New York (Jan. 25, 1995) [hereinafter Fairstein Interview].
9" See, e.g., Bill Pushed, supra note 79, at B4. "We will waste no time in making a forceful
legislative statement that 'no' means 'no'; that a victim who does not give consent to sexual
intercourse has indeed been violated; and that perpetrators will face the full penalty for rape when
they refuse to take no for an answer." Id. (quoting Senator Stewart J. Greenleaf, sponsor of bill).
' Roman, supra note 80, at A8 (quoting attorney Lynn Hecht Schafran of National
Organization for Women Legal Defense and Education Fund).
93 See ESTRICH, supra note 5, at 25; Roman, supra note 80, at AS.
14 See generally UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-402, -405, -406 (1995). Section 76-5-405 has
been amended by provisions to take effect April 29, 1996, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-405
(Supp. 1995), but such amendment does not substantively effect this Note.
95 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-402(1) (1995).
96 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-405(1)(a),(b) (1995).
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is also a first-degree felony,' but is clearly distinguished from the crime
of rape.
98
9 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-405(2) (1995). Utah's aggravated sexual assault offense imposes
minimum mandatory sentencing for convicted defendants. Id. (stating that aggravated sexual
assault is "punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for a term which is a minimum manda-
tory term of 5, 10, or 15 years and which may be for life"). The court is mandated to impose
the term of middle severity, to wit, 10 years, unless there are aggravating or mitigating
circumstances. Id. § 76-3-201(6)(a). SeegenerallyJefferyJ. DeVayshayee, RecentDevelopments,
1989 UTAH L. REV. 216 (discussing constitutionality of Utah's aggravated sexual assault statute's
mandatory sentencing provision). Section 76-5-405(2) of the Utah Code has since been amended
and effective April 29, 1996, the punishment for aggravated assault will be "imprisonment...
for an indeterminate term at not less than 5 years to life." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-405(2)
(Supp. 1995).
Utah Assistant Deputy District Attorney James Cope indicates that the aggravated sexual
assault statute is an extremely useful prosecution tool. Telephone Interview with James Cope,
Assistant Deputy District Attorney, Special Victims Unit, Salt Lake County District Attorney's
Office (Jan. 27, 1995) [hereinafter Cope Interview]. The statute gives the prosecution the option
of charging a defendant with aggravated sexual assault in order to distinguish violent and
aggravated rapes, and encourages defendants to plead guilty to rape in order to avoid the
minimum mandatory sentencing provision of the aggravated sexual assault offense. Id.
I See State v. Hancock, 874 P.2d 132, 135 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. denied, 882 P.2d 1359
(Utah 1994) (distinguishing rape from aggravated sexual assault).
Nevada takes another interesting approach. Nevada's single sexual assault provision has one
definition for sexual assault. NEv. REV. STAT. ANN § 200.366(1) (Michie 1992). Section
200.366(1) provides, in part, that "[a] person who subjects another person to sexual penetration
.. against the victim's will ... is guilty of sexual assault." Id. Sentencing is based on the pres-
ence or absence of aggravating factors, such as force or violence. Id. § 200.366(2). For
example, the sentence imposed on the defendant can depend on whether "substantial bodily harm"
to the victim results from the sexual assault. Id. Section 200.366(2) provides, in part:
2. Any person who commits a sexual assault shall be punished:
(a) If substantial bodily harm to the victim results from the actions of the
defendant committed in connection with or as a part of the sexual assault:
(1) By imprisonment in the state prison for life, without possibility of parole;
or
(2) By imprisonment in the state prison for life with possibility of parole,
eligibility for which begins when a minimum of 10 years has been served.
(b) If no substantial bodily harm to the victim results:
(1) By imprisonment in the state prison for life, with possibility of parole,
beginning when a minimum of 5 years has been served; or
(2) By imprisonment in the state prison for any definite term of 5 years or
more, with eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum of 5 years has
been served.
Id.
This approach is similar to Utah's present statutory scheme. It is susceptible, however, to
some of the same criticism as the graded-offense rape statute where juries are reluctant to convict
an aggravated and nonaggravated rapist with the same crime. See Fairstein Interview, supra note
90 (suggesting same). Since the prosecutor cannot discuss sentencing with the jury, jurors will
not know that a violent rapist will be sentenced under harsher penalties than a nonviolent rapist.
Id. Therefore, jurors who feel the need to distinguish between aggravated and nonaggravated
rapes may hesitate to convict because of the mistaken belief that both crimes will be penalized
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B. Standard of Nonconsent
However structured, statutes defining rape in terms of nonconsent
must clarify how nonconsent will be determined. In some states,
nonconsent is defined as the absence of freely given words or overt actions
demonstrating a woman's consent ("Affirmative Consent Standard"). 9
In effect, the Affirmative Consent Standard establishes a presumption of
nonconsent and creates an affirmative duty for the initiator to obtain
consent from the other party in each sexual encounter.0 Other states,
however, require that nonconsent be proven by the victim's words or
conduct or by other circumstances indicating nonconsent ("Affirmative
Nonconsent Standard").101 Thus, in these states, evidence that the victim
uttered "no" even once is sufficient to prove nonconsent. While the
satisfaction of nonconsent elements typically does not present significant
obstacles in the prosecution of rape cases," the manner in which
nonconsent is determined has important implications regarding how
equally.
99 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9a.44.010(7) (West Supp. 1995) (describing consent
as "actual words or conduct indicating freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse"). Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 940.225(4) (West 1982 & Supp. 1994) (specifying consent as "words or overt
actions by a person who is competent to give informed consent indicating a freely given
agreement to have sexual intercourse or sexual contact"); see also Lani A. Remick, Comment,
Read Her Lips: An Argumentfor a Verbal Consent Standard in Rape, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1103
(1993) (proposing verbal affirmative consent standard), Wiener, supra note 75, at 159 (suggesting
consent standard based on victim's affirmative words or acts); Ingram, supra note 10, at 28-30
(noting increasing requirement that consent means freely given words or overt actions).
Some states define consent in a similar manner, even though their rape statutes still define
rape in terms of force. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6 (Deering 1995) ("'[Clonsent' shall
be defined to mean positive cooperation in act or attitude pursuant to an exercise of free will. The
person must act freely and voluntarily and have knowledge of the nature of the act or transaction
involved."); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/12-17(a) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (defining defense of
consent as "a freely given agreement to the act of sexual penetration" and noting that "[1]ack of
verbal or physical resistance or submission. . . resulting from the use of force or threat of force
... shall not constitute consent").
'0D Remick, supra note 99, at 1114.
'01 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(1) (1995). In Utah, "[a] person commits rape
when the actor has sexual intercourse with another person without the victim's consent." UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-5-402 (1995). "Without consent" is further defined, in part, as occurring if "the
victim expresses lack of consent through words or conduct" or if "the actor is able to overcome
the victim through concealment or by the element of surprise." Id. § 76-5-406(1), (3); see also
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010(7), .060(1)(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1995) (defining
consent as actual words or conduct indicating consent, but requiring "lack of consent. . . clearly
expressed by the victim's words or conduct" for third-degree rape conviction).
12 Cope Interview, supra note 97 (indicating that manner in which nonconsent is defined is
not significant prosecuting impediment); Fairstein Interview, supra note 90 (same).
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criminal sexual conduct is defined. 03
The Affirmative Consent Standard is based on the premise that rape
law will not adequately protect a woman's right to absolute sexual
autonomy unless it creates a presumption of female nonconsent and requires
a man to obtain a woman's freely given affirmative consent prior to each
sexual encounter. 11 While nonconsent could be proven by a rape
victim's expression of verbal or physical nonconsent, °5 absent affirma-
tive nonconsent, the defendant carries the burden of proving that the
woman consented. 106
The Affirmative Consent Standard rejects the notion that an
Affirmative Nonconsent Standard comports with "'modem principles of
personal autonomy.""'  Proponents of the Affirmative Consent Standard
reason that it is inherently unfair to require the prosecution to prove
affirmative nonconsent in rape cases while no comparable requirement
exists for other crimes that contain nonconsent as an element and consent
as a defense."0 8 Therefore, it has been suggested that the Affirmative
Nonconsent Standard creates a presumption of consent, demonstrating that
103 Chamallas, supra note 5, at 777 ("The law of sex ... can operate as a value generating
force when those who create or are governed by it perceive in the law an underlying vision of
appropriate sexual conduct."). As one commentator framed the issue:
Men and women today grapple with the politics of yes. What does a solid yes look
like? Who gets to say it under what conditions, and how does it differ from no? After
centuries of being denied the ability to say no or to have consent respected as a
concept, women have been able to make the point that any no should be an
unambiguous stop. However, there has been less success at defining yes ....
Pepper Schwartz, The Politics of Desire: A New Take on the Changing Rules of Sex; Part One,
PLAYBOY, June 1994, at 53.
101 See Remick, supra note 99, at 1104-05 (arguing that, to bring nontraditional rape within
"boundaries of criminal law," redefinition of consent standard is necessary).
105 See Ingram, supra note 10, at 29 (noting that under "'no means no'" standard, defendant
would not be able to defend on basis of being uncertain about woman's consent); Remick, supra
note 99, at 1105 (proposing Affirmative Consent Standard, but noting "'no' would mean 'no'");
Wiener, supra note 75, at 156 (discussing Affirmative Consent Standard, yet noting situations
where verbal protests are sufficient resistance); see also ESTRICH, supra note 5, at 84 (discussing
feminist goal of having courts rely on female's "word as to nonconsent (not saying yes, or at least
saying no)").
106 Remick, supra note 99, at 1114; Wiener, supra note 75, at 155 (praising Wisconsin statute
for shifting consent burden to defendant (citing Wis. STAT. ANN § 940.225(3) (West 1982))); see
Ingram, supra note 10, at 28-29.
101 See Remick, supra note 99, at 1115 (quoting State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1277
(N.J. 1992)).
0 See Remick, supra note 99, at 1111, 1113. For example, in auto theft, a crime containing
nonconsent as an element and consent as a defense, "[a] mere showing that the owner never gave
the defendant permission to take the car is enough to defeat [a consent] defense; no showing that
the owner actually told the defendant not to take the car is necessary." Id. at 1111 (emphasis in
original).
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the law reflects that "society accepts a certain amount of coercion,
aggression or violence against women as a normal, even desirable, part of
sexual encounters."" °  Accordingly, "placing the burden on the defen-
dant comports with the distribution of responsibility characteristic of other
laws for which nonconsent is an element or consent is a defense: it suggests
that a man has a duty to ascertain his partner's consent before proceeding
with sexual activity""' and establishes that a woman should not be
burdened with the duty to convey nonconsent when she wishes to retain the
right to deny sexual access to her body."'
Despite the appeal of an Affirmative Consent Standard, there remains
a dispute, even among women and feminists, over the degree of protection
women truly need or desire."2 These issues have recently become the
11 Remick, supra note 99, at 1104; see Wiener, supra note 75, at 147 ("Because both men
and women are socialized to accept coercive sexuality as the norm in sexual behavior, men often
see extreme forms of this aggressive behavior as seduction, rather than rape.") (footnotes
omitted).
Ito Remick, supra note 99, at 1130.
I Remick, supra note 99, at 1111-12.
112 See Claudia Fitzherbert, Notebook: Victims? Chaps Lead the Way, DAILY TELEGRAPH,
Jan. 21, 1994, at 19. Indeed, as one woman remarked, "[it has become fashionable among my
more moderate sisters in the women's movement to pour scorn on the current emphasis on
women as victims." Id. The views of women such as Camille Paglia and Katie Roiphe are
representative of feminists who denounce recent reform efforts. See Stephanie Gutmann, The
Morning After: Sex, Fear, and Feminism on Campus, NAT'L REV., Oct. 18, 1993, at 66
[hereinafter Book Review] (reviewing KATIE ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEX, FEAR, AND
FEMINISM ON CAMPUS (1993)); Suzanne Moore, Date Rape Is One Word Too Many, THE
GUARDIAN, Jan. 15, 1993, at 9 (commenting on CAMILLE PAGLIA, SEX, ART AND AMERICAN
CULTURE (1992)); Molly O'Neill, Decades as Icon; Now Freedom, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1995,
at Cl, C10 (noting dissention within feminist ranks by women such as Katie Roiphe who "have
railed against the notion of woman-as-victim"); see also Bonilla. supra note 28, at 22 (denouncing
expanded definition of date rape and feminist focus on rape as "victimization of all women by
all men"); Stephanie Gutmann, Are All Men Rapists? Problems with the Violence Against Women
Act of 1993, NAT'L REV., Aug. 23, 1993, at 44 [hereinafter VAWA] (disparaging views that
depict rape as systematic discrimination against women).
Some women praise the view of Roiphe and Paglia for revealing the "date-rape crisis" as
a "dishonest, public re-evaluation of sexual norms" where "one huge sector of people (students,
professors, members of the 'helping professions') decides to start identifying ordinary male sexual
initiative as rape, and other huge sectors (college administrators, journalists, politicians) accept
this vision of the world." Book Review, supra, at 67. Others label such views as "loony feminist
nonsense with an appeal to 'common sense'" which concededly "identify[] the confusion sur-
rounding the date rape debate," yet are "largely ignorant of the facts." Moore, supra, at 9.
Nevertheless, even Professor Susan Estrich, a leading scholar in the field of acquaintance
rape, has suggested that "those 'who claim that a woman or man doesn't even need to say no,'
constitute'the greatest threat' to'real' date-rape victims." California Sex-Consent Law Modelfor
Others, USA TODAY, May 31, 1994, at 14A [hereinafter California Sex-Consent Law]; cf.
ESTRICH, supra note 5, at 103 (proposing that "threshold of liability" for rape should "include
at least those nontraditional rapes where the woman says no or submits only in response to
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subject of heavy debate on college campuses throughout the country.113
An often-cited study conducted in the mid-eighties reported that one in four
college women have been or will be victims of rape or attempted rape, and
that eighty-four percent of these women will know their assailants. 114 To
address this threat, one Ohio college implemented a student-drafted sexual
offense policy that requires affirmative consent at each new level of sexual
interaction between students ("Antioch Policy").115 Both women and
men, however, object to such policies" 6 and declare that distortions to
the definition of rape have exaggerated its occurrence.11 7
Although the Antioch Policy is well regarded by some for clearly
defining sexual boundaries between students,"' others criticize it for
implying that women are "so weak and gullible and innocent and naive that
[they] really needl this kind of protection in a kind of everyday sexual
encounter."119 Indeed, critics of current reform efforts also object to
[certain] lies or threats") (emphasis in original). Similarly, Pennsylvania state Representative
Karen Ritter, sponsor of the House Bill discussed in part II.A, supra, rejects the notion that a
woman must say "yes" at each level of sexual activity and "agrees strongly that saying 'no'
should be enough to convict someone of. . . a serious felony." Bumsted, supra note 80.
113 See Book Review, supra note 112, at 66; Debate Rages over Definition of Rape and Date
Rape (National Public Radio broadcast, Sept. 1, 1993) [hereinafter Debate Rages].
"I See Debate Rages, supra note 113 (discussing results of study conducted by Professor
Mary Koss of University of Arizona for Ms. magazine (the "Koss Study")).
" See Sonya Live (CNN television broadcast, Oct. 14, 1993) (interviewing Katie Roiphe and
Antioch College students regarding sexual offense policy implemented at Antioch College)
[hereinafter Cable News Network]. The Antioch Policy mandates affirmative consent and
encourages affirmative nonconsent when reasonably possible. Id. Alleged violators of the policy
must appear before the Dean of Students and a hearing board who determine the punishment
imposed on the violator. Id. Pomona College in California has a similar student conduct code,
which requires "'a clear and explicit agreement to engage in a specific activity.'" California Sex-
Consent Law, supra note 112, at 14A.
",6 See, e.g., Cable News Network, supra note 115 (discussing criticism of Antioch Policy);
Schwartz, supra note 103, at 53 (noting widespread criticism of Antioch Policy's "assault on
personal freedom" and "legislation of sexual style by committee").
17 The Koss Study, which reported that one in four college women have been or will be
raped, see supra note 114, has been the subject of much criticism. It is contended that the defini-
tion of rape used in the Koss Study was so loosely worded that an affirmative response to
questions such as "'[d]id you have sex with someone when you didn't want to because a man
gave you drugs or alcohol?'" would indicate that a rape had occurred. Cable News Network,
supra note 115 (interviewing Katie Roiphe). Essentially, the Koss Study has been labeled as "pure
hype," Debate Rages, supra note 113, that expands the scope of rape to include everything from
regretted sexual intercourse, VAWA, supra note 112, at 44, and "verbal coercion ormanipulation"
to "sex with someone who [i]s intoxicated." Cable News Network, supra note 115.
"I Cable News Network, supra note 115 (interviewing Antioch College student).
119 Id. (interviewing Katie Roiphe). Critics of the Antioch Policy argue that it is "very
condescending to have a policy saying, '[y]ou need special protection. You're not capable of
articulating your feelings, so we're going to create a safe space for you in order to do that.'" Id.
(interviewing Antioch College student). Debate over the Antioch Policy exemplifies the broad
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rape education that tends to depict all men as potential rapists and teaches
teenagers and college students that behind each date "lurk[s] sexual
peril.""2 Essentially, critics of current rape law reform efforts contend
that "the pendulum has swung too far"' and people should focus on
exactly what is being said about men and women."
Those who oppose Affirmative Consent Standards are especially
troubled by the light these rules cast upon women: they object to Affirma-
tive Consent Standards for treating women as infants, implying that women
cannot assert themselves when sexually pressured,"2 and insinuating that
women are not responsible for their own actions. 124 Because these critics
fear the "passive" view of women in the sexual arena will pervade notions
of women in other areas, they object to programs that would cause
Affirmative Consent Standards to become a part of college policies and
legislation. 125
III. ANALYSIS AND SUGGESTIONS
A. Structure of Statutes
While a graded-offense rape statute is structured to meet the goal of
higher conviction rates,"2 a single-offense rape statute conforms with the
goal of treating all rapes as equally serious offenses regardless of whether
issues of how rape and nonconsent should be defined. Some question efforts of reformers who
are "so focused on shielding women from harm that they inadvertently encourage [women] to
exalt [their] status as victims ... and refer to the powerlessness of women as if it were innate."
Adele Stan, Women Warriors, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1993, at A39.
" Cable News Network, supra note 115 (interviewing Katie Roiphe); see Katie Roiphe, Men:
What's to Be Afraid of?, CHATELAINE, July 1994, at 56 (objecting to prevailing notions that male
sexuality constitutes threat). One commentator notes that "[m]ale sexuality has been demonized."
Schwartz, supra note 103, at 53. The commentator concedes that most sexual crimes are
committed by men, yet questions "by what percentage of all men?" Id.
' Debate Rages, supra note 113.
122 Cable News Network, supra note 115 (interviewing Katie Roiphe).
Id. (interviewing Katie Roiphe); see Stan, supra note 119, at A39 (urging women to be
responsible for their actions by both physically and verbally resisting attacks).
' Cable News Network, supra note 115 (interviewing Katie Roiphe). Roiphe claims that
women like to think of men as the aggressors and themselves as victims because it allows women
to "surrender responsibility in a time of sexual ambiguity, suspicion and danger." Roiphe, supra
note 120, at 56.
12 Cable News Network, supra note 115 (interviewing college student and critic of Antioch
Policy).
'2 See ESTRICH, supra note 5, at 88-89 (discussing implementation of lesser degrees of rape
and lighter penalties to further rape law reform goal of increasing convictions); supra note 20
(discussing expansion of scope of rape law).
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aggravating circumstances are present. 7  Apparently, the disparity
between these two well-intentioned approaches can be traced to the
sometimes conflicting ideological and pragmatic goals of the Rape Law
Reform Movement. It is submitted that Utah's rape statute provides the
most effective means of achieving both these goals, while resolving the
concerns of those who oppose either the graded-offense or single-offense
rape statutes.
A graded-offense rape statute has several flaws and limitations.
Supporters of the graded-offense statute point out that a rapist who uses
additional violence or creates other aggravating circumstances should be
subjected to a higher penalty than a rapist who does not.'" This goal,
however, is accomplished at the expense of undermining the very principles
rape law aims to protect. Specifically, a graded-offense rape statute
continues to define rape in terms of force and, thus, fails to reflect that the
interests protected in modem rape law are women's rights to sexual
autonomy" 9 and bodily integrity.13
Some reluctantly support graded-offense rape statutes in order to
obtain more convictions by judges and juries who are hesitant to convict
acquaintance and stranger rapists of the same crime.3 Graded-offense
statutes, however, arguably have been no more effective in that respect
than single-offense statutes. One study revealed that a higher-degree statute
that explicitly defines rape in forcible terms effectively "'preempt[s]"' the
content of the lesser, nonaggravated rape offense, "'render[ing] its
1 See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
'2 See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
129 Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence of
Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780, 1782-83 (1992) (describing
historical change in rape laws); Remick, supra note 99, at 1104. Thus, "[w]hat is meant by
sexual autonomy [in this context] is the freedom to refuse to have sex with any one for any
reason." Dripps, supra, at 1785.
,-o See Dix, supra note 10, at 17 (noting that rape law protects "privacy and integrity" of
victim's bodies); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 263 (Deering 1995). Interestingly, California's
rape statute specifies that "[t]he essential guilt of rape consists in the outrage to the person and
feelings of the victim of the rape. Any sexual penetration, however slight, is sufficient to
complete the crime." Id.
" See supra note 89 and accompanying text. Ironically, a version of the graded-offense
statute was enacted in Pennsylvania in response to a case where the jury convicted under a single-
offense rape statute, but the verdict was subsequently reversed due to the statute's force element.
See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. Though Berkowitz's jury verdict would seem to
indicate the willingness ofjuries to convict nonaggravated rapes under a single rape statute, it has
been suggested that mostjuries would not have convicted under similar facts. Fairstein Interview,
supra note 90 (suggesting Berkowitz was atypical because it resulted in prosecution and
conviction).
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prosecution difficult. "",3 2 Also, it has been suggested that the classifica-
tion of rape as a graded offense masks the problem that low conviction
rates are often related to the fact that prosecutors, judges, and juries are
reluctant to prosecute or convict, as the case may be, where additional
elements of force and physical resistance are absent.'33
The Utah statute presents a hybrid of the graded-offense and single-
offense rape statutes. As noted in Part II.A of this Note, in Utah, there is
a single rape offense.'34 There is also, however, a separate crime called
"aggravated sexual assault," which includes rape and other sexual offenses
committed under aggravating circumstances.'35 Significantly, both rape
and aggravated sexual assault are first-degree felonies,'36 and the defini-
tion of rape-nonconsensual sexual intercourse-does not incorporate
aggravating factors.
It is submitted that a statute modeled after Utah's rape statute would
meet the symbolic and pragmatic goals of rape law reform. Such a statute
would treat both stranger and acquaintance rape equally as one crime,
reflecting the view that the state should punish violations of a person's right
to sexual autonomy and bodily integrity regardless of whether additional
injury results. The statute also, however, offers the alternative aggravated
offense which helps prosecutors, judges, and juries distinguish between
rape and aggravated rape and, if necessary, pursue stricter sentencing to
32 ESTRICH, supra note 5, at 89 (quoting results of study conducted by Professor Wallace
Loh of University of Washington on effectiveness of Washington's graded-offense rape statute
in Wallace Loh, The Impact of Common Law and Reform Rape Statutes on Prosecution: An
Empirical Study, 55 WASH. L. REV. 543, 552 (1980)).
133 Id.; see BESSMER, supra note 22, at 110, 123 (noting that police and prosecutors are
reluctant to act where rape accusations stand on uncorroborated testimony of victim because juries
are less likely to convict).
'34 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-402(1) (1995). Section 76-5-402(1) provides that "[a] person
commits rape when the actor has sexual intercourse with another person without the victim's
consent." Id.
135 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-405(1) (1995). Section 76-5-405(1) provides:
(1) A person commits aggravated sexual assault if in the course of a rape or attempted
rape, object rape or attempted object rape, forcible sodomy or attempted forcible
sodomy, or forcible sexual abuse or attempted forcible sexual abuse the actor:
(a) causes bodily injury to the victim;
(b) uses or threatens the victim by use of a dangerous weapon as defined in
Section 76-1-601;
(c) compels, or attempts to compel, the victim to submit to rape, object rape,
forcible sodomy, or forcible sexual abuse, by threat of kidnapping, death, or
serious bodily injury to be inflicted imminently on any person; or
(d) is aided or abetted by one or more persons.
Id.
136 See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-402(3), -405(2) (1995 & Supp. 1995); see also supra note
97 (discussing sentencing under aggravated sexual assault statute).
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account for aggravating circumstances.
B. Standard for Nonconsent
For rape law to comport with societal norms, it must reflect the
concept that victims of acquaintance rape need protection, yet recognize
that it regulates the most intimate aspect of people's lives. Of course, the
United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that a line does not have
to be drawn around intimate behavior.'37 Nevertheless, due to the nature
of the conduct being regulated, a consent standard should be drafted to
reflect that which people desire.
A nonconsent standard that requires affirmative words or overt actions
of consent is troublesome for several reasons. First, it arguably includes
within its definition noncriminal sexual behavior. Second, in an effort to
secure absolute sexual autonomy for women, it places too much responsi-
bility on men and commands individuals to conduct sexual relations in a
manner which does not necessarily reflect society's needs or desires.
Conversely, an Affirmative Nonconsent Standard is preferable because it
provides protection for all acquaintance rape victims in a manner that does
not incorporate noncriminal behavior. Furthermore, it promotes equal
responsibility by men and women in all sexual encounters.
The reasoning of women who vehemently oppose current rape reform
efforts is flawed in many respects: these women do not include certain
incidents of nonconsensual intercourse in their definition of rape;'38 they
131 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195-96 (1986) (upholding Georgia statute
criminalizing consensual sodomy).
'-$ See CableNews Network, supra note 115 (interviewing Katie Roiphe); Bonilla, supra note
28, at 22 (criticizing Koss Study and noting that "[o]nly three of the five questions in the survey
mentioned threat or use of physical force as a basis for discerning whether or not a rape had
occurred"). When asked to define rape, Roiphe stated:
[The use of physical force, the serious threat of physical force, or sex with someone
who's incapacitated, namely, someone who [i]s passed out drunk .... I think all of
those things are rape. What I don't think is rape is ... when you were drunk and
something happened that[] you ... wished hadn't happened the next morning. And
that's what I think is a gray area here.
Cable News Network, supra note 115 (interview with Katie Roiphe). Clearly, her definition of
a "gray area" in sexual relations is overbroad. The dispute over the validity of the Koss Study,
see supra note 114, apparently centers around a disagreement over exactly what acts constitute
rape. Those who question the results of the Koss Study apparently feel that rape should be defined
in terms of force.
Labelling all allegations of nonaggravated rape as lies constructed by women who have
'morning after regrets," however, seriously undermines legitimate rape reform efforts. Extremist
attempts to prevent the definition of rape from including acts which very few would consider rape
gloss over the real "gray area" that falls between a forceful rape and "morning after
regrets"-such as incidents where the woman simply says "no" but does not physically resist.
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misplace the source of feminist views on rape; 39 and they fail to recog-
nize that all women do not have the same strengths." Extremist views
such as these have caused people to focus on exactly what is being said
about men and women and have demonstrated that not all women agree that
an Affirmative Consent Standard is a desirable way to regulate sexual
behavior.
Clearly, "ordinary male sexual initiative" exists. 4 While this
behavior is not necessarily desirable to all women, the law must reflect that
only some of it is criminal. Unfortunately, some women submit to sexual
intercourse for reasons that are less than admirable.'42 If a woman
unwillingly yet silently submits to intercourse, her lack of verbal or overt
consent should not deem the resulting sexual intercourse criminal. While
it is highly desirable that no woman should ever submit to any unwanted
sexual act, teaching men and women how to behave sexually in situations
where there is no criminal intent should not be accomplished through the
penal code. An Affirmative Nonconsent Standard reflects this distinction,
13 Roiphe points to anger as the source of feminist views, urging that women should keep
their "fear and rage in perspective." Roiphe, supra note 120, at 56. While conceding that
"[t]here is nothing wrong with anger in feminism," id., she believes that women's views on
sexual harassment and date rape are tainted by their personal experiences: "The truth is we bring
so much that is personal into our conversations about men and women: the time our fathers
embarrassed us at our 6th birthday party, the boyfriends who left us, the boyfriends we left, the
husbands who have sordid affairs with our best friends." Id. Clearly, it is demeaning and
untenable to claim that all womens' views on the categorization of nonconsensual sexual activity
as date rape derive from such thoughts.
140 The failure to recognize nonforceful rape as rape indicates that Roiphe, and those who
agree with her, assume all women are equally aggressive. See Cable News Network, supra note
115 (noting comment that "Ms. Roiphe, obviously, has benefitted greatly from having a...
strong sense of self"). As mentioned in part II.A, supra, all women do not react to rape in a
uniform manner, especially in acquaintance rape situations where acquaintances rely on "'shock
and embarrassment"' to overcome their victims. Tyre & Parente, supra note 74, at A5 (quoting
detective in New York City Police Department).
One woman revealed that a guest at her college roommate's party let himself into her room
while she slept, "gripped" her arms over her head, and raped her. Stan, supra note 119, at A39.
She verbally protested, but "was afraid to do so too loudly, for just outside the door lurked the
beer-soaked players of an entire hockey team." Id. Recalling both "boasts from athletes about
girls who had . . . serviced 10 or 15 members in a single night," and advice from police experts
on violent crime who discourage violent resistance, she opted for self-preservation and "resigned
[herself] to her fate." Id. Her story illustrates that calculated efforts at self-preservation are all
too easily classified as passive responses not worthy of protection by rape laws.
4' Book Review, supra note 112, at 66.
142 Ingram, supra note 10, at 25 (citing some reasons as "[s]he doesn't want to seem a prude;
• ..she likes him and wants to keep seeing him; [and] she may think that she did sort of lead
him on").
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while an Affirmative Consent Standard, though well-intentioned, does
not. 143
A nonconsent standard must be drafted to strike a balance between the
interests of both men and women. Of course, responsibility in sexual
relations should not lie solely with women." There is concern, howev-
er, that serious criminal liability will be assessed against men where no
criminal intent is proven. 45  An Affirmative Nonconsent Standard
balances these concerns more effectively than does an Affirmative Consent
Standard.
In the past, many states dispensed with a mens rea requirement for
rape because it was clear that intercourse compelled by force and against
the resistance of the woman demonstrated a criminal state of mind.
46
Where, however, rape is defined in terms of nonconsent, and nonconsent
is defined by an Affirmative Consent Standard, the elements that historical-
ly replaced the mens rea are removed from the statute. Perhaps for these
reasons, some commentators object to an Affirmative Consent Standard for
assessing criminal liability where the defendant lacks subjective intent or
actual knowledge. 47  While this notion has sometimes been rejected, t"
those not persuaded by such denials may be less troubled by an Affirmative
41 The focus of this section is not whether the Affirmative Consent Standard is unconstitu-
tionally overbroad. Courts have upheld legislatures' ability to create such standards, rejecting
defendants' claims that they impermissibly define criminal behavior in a vague manner where no
knowledge or intent is required. See, e.g., State v. Lederer, 299 N.W.2d 457, 460-61 (WVis. Ct.
App. 1980); infra note 147 and accompanying text. Rather, the focus of this subpart is whether,
given the choice, legislatures should use an Affirmative Consent Standard above an Affirmative
Nonconsent Standard.
,44 Contra Ingram, supra note 10, at 25 n.157 (noting that some men take view that "once
aroused, [men] cannot control their sexual desires, placing responsibility for any ensuing inter-
course on women" (citing Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed?Rape Myths and the Idea
of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1013, 1048 (1991))).
145 See Dix, supra note 10, at 17; see also infra note 149 and accompanying text. Professor
George E. Dix, A.W. Walker Centennial Chair in Law at the University of Texas at Austin,
suggests that the severity of rape punishment mandates an inquiry into the defendant's awareness
of the complainant's nonconsent.
'46 See supra note 7 (discussing mens rea in rape offenses).
147 See Wiener, supra note 75, at 158 (noting that "[criminalizing failure to ensure consent
might be questioned" by some for lack of mens rea); Dix, supra note 10. at 17 (cautioning that
"a person should not be found guilty of a serious crime in the absence of proof that the person
was aware of the major facts and circumstances that justify making the conduct criminal").
143 Wiener, supra note 75, at 158 & n.97 (discussing that modem criminal law may aim to
induce conformity to objective standard, rather than punishing for morally culpable behavior);
cf. Roberson v. State, 501 So. 2d 398, 401 (Miss. 1987) (holding that absence of explicit mens
rea language in crime of sexual battery-nonconsensual sexual penetration-does not render
statute unconstitutionally vague since "[1legislature may define a crime which depends on no
mental element and consists only of forbidden acts or omissions") (citation omitted).
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Nonconsent Standard. An Affirmative Nonconsent Standard comports with
the historic rationale for dispensing with the mens rea requirement because
intercourse accompanied by expressed nonconsent demonstrates criminal
intent.
Furthermore, some commentators contend that rape statutes should
include an express mens rea requirement. 49 While some have proposed
a mens rea of recklessness, which demonstrates awareness or knowl-
edge, 50  several have suggested that a negligence standard is more
appropriate.' 5' Thus, a mens rea of negligence under an Affirmative
Consent Standard asserts that a defendant's reliance on nonverbal or
nonovert consent is per se unreasonable, placing on all men the affirmative
duty of inquiry.52
In comparison, a mens rea of negligence under an Affirmative
Nonconsent Standard is a more equitable way of assessing liability by
declaring that a defendant's sexual acts, despite words, conduct, or
circumstances indicating nonconsent, are per se unreasonable. 153 This
places a duty on both the woman to communicate her nonconsent and on
the man to be receptive to the woman's communication.
'19 See, e.g., ESTRICH, supra note 5, at 96-98 (proposing that rape law should include mens
rea element so that focus is on defendant's state of mind rather than victim's); Dix. supra note
10, at 17 (contending that "failure to require awareness of the complainant's non-consent is likely
to violate the due-process requirement that criminal liability not be outrageously disproportionate
to the blameworthiness of the offender's conduct"); Mary I. Coombs, Telling the Victim's Story,
2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 277, 287-88 (1993) (concluding that serious crimes such as rape require
mens rea and conceding that plausible reform effort cannot make accused's perspective "wholly
irrelevant").
150 Dix, supra note 10, at 17. Professor Dix contends that a mens rea of recklessness should
be applied, "requir[ing] proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was actually aware of
a significant risk that the complainant was not consenting." Id.
S See, e.g., ESTRICH, supra note 5, at 97-98; Remick, supra note 99, at 1131.
52 Remick, supra note 99, at 1132.
153 See ESTRICH, supra note 5, at 103 ("Reasonable men should be held to know that no
means no . . . ."). The aggressor is held to know that a verbal protest or like action means
nonconsent, whether or not emphatically stated. See id. In one case, a defendant conceded that
the victim said "no" "'in a very quiet, soft voice,'" but maintained that "[h]e thought by saying
'no' she meant '[s]low down. You're going too fast. Take your time.'" State v. Bowen, 609
N.E.2d 346, 353 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (quoting defendant's testimony). Apparently, some men
interpret the word "no" depending on "context and nonverbal signals" so that "no" can mean
"'maybe,' 'convince me,' 'back off for awhile,' or 'get lost.'" John Leo, Don't Oversimplify Date
Rape, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Feb. 11, 1991, at 17; see Remick, supra note 99, at 1146
n. 159 (citing Leo's interpretation of "no"). Clearly, a strictly enforced Affirmative Nonconsent
Standard would leave no room for such interpretations and, thus, proceeding despite a victim's
statement of "no" would be criminal conduct.
As Professor Estrich suggests, "unreasonableness as to consent, understood to mean ignoring
a woman's words, should be sufficient for liability." ESTRICH, supra note 5. at 103.
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Proponents of the Affirmative Consent Standard note that, in many
instances, the victim's verbal nonconsent is not sufficient evidence to
sustain a rape conviction."s This occurs, however, in jurisdictions where
statutes define rape in terms of force. 5 Where the force element is
removed and nonconsent is defined in terms of the victim's words or
conduct, the victim's verbal protests or actions are sufficient. 56
The Affirmative Consent Standard has been proposed as superior
because it eliminates evaluations of individuals' reasonable responses.
57
Noting the difficulty in assessing reasonable behavior due to inherent
miscommunication between men and women, 158  one commentator
questioned whether a court could "easily conclude that the victim's
behavior does not reasonably convey to the defendant her lack of
consent."5 9 If, however, an Affirmative Consent Standard requires
courts to consider overt actions evincing consent, it also suffers from the
problems encountered when interpreting whether a woman's actions
1-1 See Wiener, supra note 75, at 157 & n.90 (concluding that verbal resistance is
unpredictable standard for lack of consent); Remick, supra note 99, at 1113 (noting that verbal
resistance is insufficient evidence of nonconsent in many states).
5s5 See Wiener, supra note 75, at 151-52 (discussing California's and Massachusetts' rape
statutes).
11 See State v. Lederer, 299 N.W.2d 457, 461 (vis. Ct. App. 1980) ("'No' means no, and
precludes any finding that the prosecutrix consented to any of the sexual acts performed during
the night."). In another case, State ex. reL J.F.S., the Court of Appeals of Utah for the first time
interpreted a consent standard that provides that lack of consent can be expressed through the
victim's words or conduct. 803 P.2d 1254, 1257-60 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citing UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5-406 (1990)), cert. denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). The court applied the clear
meaning of the statutory provision and found that the victims' verbal protests evidenced
nonconsent through words, and the victims' attempts to get out from under the defendant and
hitting him evidenced conduct indicating lack of consent. Id. at 1260-61. While the victims did
more than just say "no," the statute defined lack of consent as expressions of words or conduct;
thus, seemingly, verbal expressions of nonconsent alone would suffice as nonconsent under the
plain meaning of the statute.
See also Remick, supra note 99, at 1116 (commenting that "[i]n order to effectuate a 'no
means no' standard in the law of rape, . . .the force requirement must be eliminated").
's See Wiener, supra note 75, at 157.
s Wiener, supra note 75, at 147-49. For example, if, in an initially consensual sexual
encounter, a woman believes that she is conveying nonconsent, and other women agree, that
woman's behavior would be considered reasonable. Id. at 148. But, if the man does not think that
she is conveying lack of consent and proceeds, the woman may read his persistence as an
indication that he plans to have intercourse with her despite her nonconsent, and may submit out
of fear. Id. at 148-49. If other men would agree that the woman did not indicate nonconsent, the
man's conduct could be considered reasonable. Id. at 148. The issue, therefore, is to determine
whether reasonable behavior is to be judged from the man's or the woman's perspective. Id. at
149.
1s9 Wiener, supra note 75, at 157.
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indicated nonconsent. 160 Determining whether a woman's actions
indicated consent will be an equally difficult task, especially where the
sexual encounter in question was initially consensual.
A nonconsent standard requiring affirmative nonconsent has also been
challenged for excluding protection in cases where the victim is paralyzed
with fear, surprise, or shock, or the victim offers no resistance because of
fear of retaliation by the actor. 16 1  Clearly, such behavior by the victim
should not be construed as consent. Accordingly, many jurisdictions set
forth circumstances that indicate lack of consent, even where force is still
an element of the crime of rape.162 As one court noted:
Merely because a victim does not cry out for help or try to escape at the
slightest opportunity is not determinative on the issues of whether she was
being forced to have sexual intercourse, or whether she consented to
having sexual intercourse, especially if she was threatened or in fear of
being harmed, overcome by the superior strength of the assailant, or
paralyzed by fear. 63
Accordingly, statutes drafted pursuant to an Affirmative Nonconsent
Standard must delineate circumstances which would be treated as indicating
lack of consent to ensure protection for those victims who are unable to
express nonconsent through words or conduct.1"
Articulating an adequate standard of nonconsent is more than a matter
of semantics. If the law of sexual conduct truly "operate[s] as a value
generating force when those who create or are governed by it perceive in
the law an underlying vision of appropriate sexual conduct,"'" the way
"60 Id. (conceding same).
16, See Remick, supra note 99, at 1112 (declaring rape laws that require affirmative
demonstration of nonconsent "'regardol mere submission as consent [and] failol to offer persons
vulnerable to those assaults adequate protection'" (quoting Lois Pineau, Date Rape: A Feminist
Analysis, 8 LAW & PHIL. 217, 221 (1989))).
62 See, e.g., People v. Iniguez, 872 P.2d 1183, 1187 (Cal. 1994) (allowing subjective
standard of fear due to "'studies [that] have demonstrated that while some women respond to
sexual assault with active resistance, others 'freeze,' and become helpless from panic and
numbing fear.'" (quoting People v. Barnes, 721 P.2d 110, 118 (Cal. 1986))); People v. Bowen,
609 N.E.2d 346, 356 (I11. App. Ct.) (noting that consent is not present where victim fails to cry
out or escape because "paralyzed by fear"), appeal denied, 616 N.E.2d 339 (Ill.), cert. denied.,
114 S.Ct. 387 (1993).
6 Bowen, 609 N.E.2d at 356.
6 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(3) (1995) ("the actor is able to overcome the
victim through concealment or by the element of surprise"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252
(Supp. 1994) ("[the actor has impaired] substantially the ability of the other person to appraise
or control conduct by administering or employing drugs or intoxicants without the knowledge or
against the will of the other person").
'6 Chamallas, supra note 5, at 777.
[Vol. 69:291
ACQUAINTANCE RAPE
in which a nonconsent standard is framed can largely affect the intimate
behavior of all who are subjected to it. Thus, an Affirmative Consent
Standard is objectionable-not because it is "unduly 'unromantic,' '  but
because it falsely assumes that affirmative consent is desirable and
necessary'67 and, thus, regulates intimacy in a manner that does not
necessarily represent the views of most men and women. t6 8
Further, by allowing nonconsent to be proven by the surrounding
circumstances of the rape, an Affirmative Nonconsent Standard provides
protection to victims of acquaintance rape who have expressed nonconsent
but are unable to prove affirmative nonconsent. It also encourages the
highly desirable goal of equal responsibility in sexual relations. As part of
that shared responsibility, women should be encouraged to express
nonconsent and men should be taught to ensure that their partners are
consenting when affirmative nonconsent is not given.
Many sexual encounters are fraught with poor communication. In
such situations, a "no" can act as a preventative measure to stop those men
who had no intention of proceeding despite nonconsent. It can also serve
as proof of nonconsent to convict the rapist who does proceed.
IV. ADDITIONAL REFORM EFFORTS
Due to the ease with which statutory reform may be "'thwarted"' by
individuals who exercise discretion in the criminal justice system,' 9 it is
important to briefly mention additional steps that can be taken to increase
prosecution and conviction rates in acquaintance rape cases.
16 Ingram, supra note 10, at 34. Ingram conceded that many find express consent standards
'unduly 'unromantic.'" Id. Similarly, one advocate for an Affirmative Consent Standard reasons
that some object to such a standard because "seeking and acquiring verbal consent would 'ruin
the moment.'" Remick, supra note 99, at 1148. In view of the gravity of the threat of rape, such
objections alone would certainly be unwarranted.
167 For instance, one advocate of the Affirmative Consent Standard proposed: "[I]n reality,
informed, consensual, pleasurable sexual encounters are the result of communication, not silence;
and since verbal messages are the clearest, most unequivocal variety of sexual communication,
they are also most likely to lead to desirable sexual encounters." Remick, supra note 99, at 1148.
Also, one commentator conceded that "it can well be argued that being sure of your partner's
consent and desire is the ultimate demonstration of respect and the best possible way to earn the
trust and confidence that 'romantic' overtures are supposedly designed to accomplish." Ingram,
supra note 10, at 34. These justifications are troubling-not because it is undesirable to
demonstrate respect, earn trust and confidence, or be aware of a partner's consent or nonconsent,
but because it is improper to tell people to achieve these goals through verbal consent when other
methods of protecting women exist.
"' See supra notes 112, 116-17 (discussing opposition to Affirmative Consent Standards and
current reform efforts addressing acquaintance rape).
169 SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 5, at 160.
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Clearly, jurors' increased understanding of the reality of acquaintance
rape will help to win convictions. 7 A larger problem exists, however,
in that many difficult acquaintance rape cases are never prosecuted because
of the prejudices 7' and inexperience"n of prosecuting attorneys. More-
over, in many jurisdictions, prosecutors do not have the resources to try
acquaintance rape cases.'n
Investigative techniques employed by district attorneys' offices with
specialized sex-crimes units can help win cases that are otherwise too easily
dismissed by many prosecutors. For example, because there is usually an
existing relationship between the victim and the assailant, willing victims
have participated with investigators to confront rapists and obtain
audiotaped admissions of the crimes. 74 Also, where a victim shows no
70 Two elements that are often present in acquaintance rape cases are areas of particular juror
bias: (1) victims have behavior traits such as drug and alcohol use and frequenting bars late at
night and (2) acquaintance rapists are often attractive, well-regarded members of the community
with no other criminal record and, thus, do not appear to be the "criminal type." FAIRSTEIN,
supra note 30, at 134-35; see VACHSS, supra note 74, at 66 (stating juries may not be as likely
to convict where they do not like victim). However, rapists "have things in common that are not
cultural or economic." Id. at 126.
One study revealed that, though jurors were aware that they were not supposed to bejudgmental about acquaintance rape victims, they admitted that they often were. FAIRSTEIN, supra
note 30, at 134 (citing results of study conducted by National Center for Prevention and Control
of Rape on jurors' attitudes in sex offense cases).
It has been suggested that rapists rely on obvious prejudices to "look for whatever
vulnerability might insulate them from capture and punishment." VACHSS, supra note 74, at 91.
Unfortunately, jurors affected by such stereotypes perpetuate the myth that rape is act of sexual
desire, rather than an act of power and violence. See FAIRSTEIN, supra note 30, at 135-36;
VACHSS, supra note 74, at 125.
"I' See VACHSS, supra note 74, at 90-91 (describing trait some assistant district attorneys
would attribute to "Good Victim"); Leive, supra note 74, at 198-201 (reporting unwarranted
instances where prosecutors decline pursuit of difficult acquaintance rape charges); Fairstein Inter-
view, supra note 90 (suggesting it is "battle" to get prosecutors to try many acquaintance rape
cases).
1' See FAIRSTEIN, supra note 30, at 138. Experienced attorneys in specialized units are better
equipped to prepare for and prosecute acquaintance rape cases. Id.; see also VACHSS, supra note
74, at 141 (suggesting assistant district attorneys decline prosecution of certain cases to preserve
high conviction rates).
'73 FAIRSTEIN, supra note 30, at 152. However, larger offices, such as Manhattan's district
attorney's office, are able to "set an outstanding example by providing [sex crimes] unit[s] with
the resources to take to trial every case in which a credible victim is willing to participate." Id.
'7 See FAIRSTEIN, supra note 30, at 159-60. For example, in New York, courts permit
audiotaping conversations where one party to the conversation (here, the victim) consents. Id. at
169.
[M]ost street criminals are far too savvy to succumb to this ploy, but the colossal
arrogance of the better-educated offenders-the professional men, espe-
cially-frequently lets them play right into our hands. They always seem to be so
certain that they can explain their conduct satisfactorily or assuage the aggrieved
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external injuries, a prompt medical examination can provide prosecutors
with evidence of internal damage often caused by forced intercourse.
Other effective techniques include videotaping repeat offenders, 7 6
"shrewd" jury selection, extensive preparation of victim testimony, and the
use of expert witnesses. 7  By mandating the use of such techniques,
district attorneys' offices can minimize the amount of discretion prosecutors
may exercise before dismissing complaints. Essentially, dedication is the
key element to successfully prosecuting difficult acquaintance rape
cases. 1
78
CONCLUSION
The current debate over the degree of protection women need and
desire reminds us that perhaps the only thing more complex than sexual
conduct itself is the law that must regulate such conduct. Certainly, the
goals of rape law reformers sometimes conflict. Nonetheless, by carefully
drafting rape statutes and employing special techniques to facilitate the
prosecution of acquaintance rape cases, the pragmatic goal of increased
convictions can be met without abandoning the important symbolic goals
of the Rape Law Reform Movement.
Kathleen F Cairney
woman with an excuse or apology, and they often end up incriminating themselves
instead.
Id. at 169-70.
' FAIRSTEIN, supra note 30, at 153.
176 See id. at 155-66 (recounting successful implementation of videotaping technique on New
York dentist); Leive, supra note 74, at 253 (discussing use and relatively low cost of technique).
' See Leive, supra note 74, at 253 (discussing various prosecution techniques).
m See id. ("The kiss of death in a courtroom is a prosecutor who appears apathetic or,
worse, unconvinced. 'Jurors can smell it when a prosecutor is just going through the motions'
...." (quoting Paul Anderson, District Attorney of Stillwater, Oklahoma)).
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APPENDIX
MODEL RAPE STATUTE
§ X. RAPE
(a) A person commits rape when he or she has sexual intercourse with
another person without the consent of such person.
(b) Consent. An act of sexual intercourse is without the consent of a
person under any of the following circumstances:
(1) that person expresses lack of consent through words or
conduct;
(2) the actor is able to overcome that person by an element of
fear, surprise, or shock; or
(3) [OTHER USUAL CIRCUMSTANCES (e.g., age, incapaci-
ty)].
(c) Rape is a first degree felony.
§ XX. AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULT
(a) A person commits aggravated sexual assault if, in the course of a rape
or attempted rape [or other sexual offense], the actor:
(1) causes bodily injury to the victim;
(2) uses or threatens the victim by use of a dangerous weapon;
(3) compels, or attempts to compel, the victim to submit to rape
[or other sexual offenses] by threat of kidnapping, death, or
serious bodily injury to be inflicted imminently on any person; or
(4) is aided or abetted by one or more persons.
(b) Aggravated sexual assault is a first degree felony.
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